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Abstract: A substantial generalisation is put forward of the theory of subjective fiducial
inference as it was outlined in earlier papers. In particular, this theory is extended to deal with
cases where the data are discrete or categorical rather than continuous, and cases where there
was important pre-data knowledge about some or all of the model parameters. The system for
directly expressing and then handling this pre-data knowledge, which is via what are referred to
as global and local pre-data functions for the parameters concerned, is distinct from that which
involves attempting to directly represent this knowledge in the form of a prior distribution
function over these parameters, and then using Bayes’ theorem. In this regard, the individual
attributes of what are identified as three separate types of fiducial argument, namely the strong,
moderate and weak fiducial arguments, form an integral part of the theory that is developed.
Various practical examples of the application of this theory are presented, including examples
involving binomial, Poisson and multinomial data. The fiducial distribution functions for the
parameters of the models in these examples are interpreted in terms of a generalised definition
of subjective probability that was set out previously.
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1. Introduction
The theory of subjective fiducial inference was first proposed in Bowater (2017b), and
was then modified and extended to deal with more general inferential problems in which
various parameters are unknown in Bowater (2018a). A further analysis that supports
the adoption of this approach to inference is provided in Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b).
References to loosely related work in the general area of fiducial inference can be found
in the first two of these three papers.
The aim of the present work is to substantially generalise this theory of inference as it
was defined in Bowater (2018a). In particular, this theory will be extended to deal with
cases where the data are discrete or categorical rather than continuous, and cases where
there was important knowledge about some or all of the model parameters before the
data were observed. Such knowledge, which will be termed ‘pre-data knowledge’, will be
treated as being distinct from ‘prior knowledge’, since the use of this latter term usually
exclusively implies that inferences will be made under the Bayesian paradigm.
The development of the earlier theory will be at a level that is sufficient to justify the
theory being renamed as ‘organic fiducial inference’. Also, the use of the word ‘subjective’
in the original name caused confusion as for some this meant that the theory must
substantially depend on personal beliefs, or in some other way must be far from being
objective. As was explained in Bowater (2018a) and Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b), this
was not the case for the original theory, and is not generally the case for the theory that
is about to be presented. The word ‘organic’ in the new name, however, still emphasizes
that the theory is designed for living subjects, e.g. humans, and not for robots.
For cases in which nothing or very little was known about the model parameters before
the data were observed, the motivation for this paper is similar to how the need for the
work in Bowater (2018a) was justified, that is, it is motivated by the severe criticisms that
generally can be made in these cases against the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to
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inference. These criticisms, some of which are well known, were set out in Section 4 of
Bowater (2017b) and Sections 2 and 7 of Bowater (2018a), and to save space they will
not be repeated here.
In other cases that will be of interest, i.e. where there is moderate to strong pre-data
knowledge about some or all of the model parameters, conventional schools of infer-
ence can also be inadequate. In particular, frequentist theory is a generally inflexible
framework for incorporating such knowledge into the inferential process. For example,
it has proved, on the whole, very difficult to adapt the confidence interval approach to
situations where we simply know, before the data was observed, that values in a given
subset of the natural space of a parameter of interest are impossible, see for example
Mandelkern (2002) and the references therein. On the other hand, while our pre-data
knowledge about some or all of the model parameters may be substantial, it may not be
comprehensive enough in many situations to be adequately incorporated into a Bayesian
analysis by placing a prior density function over the parameters in question.
Let us now summarise the structure of the paper. Some brief comments about the
concept of probability that will be used in the paper are made in the following section.
Further concepts, principles and definitions that underlie the theory of organic fiducial in-
ference in cases where only one model parameter is unknown are presented and discussed
in Section 3. In relation to earlier work, an account is then given in Section 4 of how this
methodology is extended to include cases where various parameters are unknown.
In the second half of the paper, the theory is applied to various examples. In particular
in Sections 5 and 6, problems of inference based on both continuous and discrete data
are examined where nothing or very little was known about the model parameters before
the data were observed. Examples are then discussed in Section 7 where the natural
parameter space is restricted as a result of pre-data knowledge about the case in question,
and finally in Section 8, the impact of more general forms of pre-data knowledge about
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the model parameters is illustrated.
2. Generalised subjective probability
The definition of probability upon which the theory of organic fiducial inference will
be based is the definition of subjective probability that was presented in Bowater and
Guzma´n (2018b), although the key concept of similarity that this definition relies on was
introduced in Bowater (2017a), and discussed in Bowater (2017b) and Bowater (2018a).
For the sake of convenience, this definition of probability will be referred to as generalised
subjective probability.
Under this definition, a probability distribution is defined by its distribution func-
tion, which has the usual mathematical properties of such a function, and the strength
of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest. In very loose terms,
the strength of a distribution function is essentially a measure of how well the distri-
bution function represents a given individual’s uncertainty about the random variable
concerned. In this paper, we will be primarily interested in the external strength of
a continuous distribution function as specified by Definitions 5 and 7 of Bowater and
Guzma´n (2018b). To avoid repeating all the technical details, the reader is invited to
examine these definitions as well as the application of these definitions to a fundamental
problem of statistical inference in Sections 3.6 and 3.7 of this earlier paper.
Although generalised subjective probability will be the adopted definition of proba-
bility, the concept of strength will not be explicitly discussed in the sections that imme-
diately follow in order to give a more digestible introduction to the other main concepts
that underlie organic fiducial inference. Instead, the role of this definition of probabil-
ity in organic fiducial inference will be fully examined when this method of inference is
applied to examples later in the paper.
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3. Univariate organic fiducial inference
3.1. Sampling model and data generation
In general, it will be assumed that a sampling model that depends on one or various
unknown parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk generates the data x. Let the joint density or mass
function of the data given the true values of θ1, θ2, . . . , θk be denoted as g(x | θ1, θ2, . . . , θk).
For the moment, though, we will assume that the only unknown parameter in the model
is θj, either because there are no other parameters in the model, or because the true
values of the parameters in the set θ−j = {θ1, . . . , θj−1, θj+1, . . . , θk} are known.
In a change from Bowater (2018a), the following more general definition of a fiducial
statistic will be applied.
Definition 1: A fiducial statistic
A fiducial statistic Q(x) will be defined as being the only statistic in a sufficient set of one-
dimensional statistics that is not an ancillary statistic. Of course, given this requirement,
there may not exist any possible choice for this kind of statistic. However, in this paper,
we will only consider cases where this definition can be successfully applied. In other
cases, a way of defining the fiducial statistic is to allow it to be any one-to-one function
of a unique maximum likelihood estimator of θj. This latter criterion was applied in
Section 5.7 of Bowater (2018a).
We will also make a more general assumption about the way in which the data were
generated than in this earlier paper.
Assumption 1: Data generating algorithm
Independent of the way in which the data were actually generated, it will be assumed
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that the data set x was generated by the following algorithm:
1) Simulate the values of the ancillary complements, if any exist, of a given fiducial
statistic Q(x).
2) Generate a value γ for a continuous one-dimensional random variable Γ, which has a
density function pi0(γ) that does not depend on the parameter θj.
3) Determine a value q(x) for the fiducial statistic Q(x) by setting Γ equal to γ and
q(x) equal to Q(x) in the following expression, which effectively defines the distribution
function of Q(x):
Q(x) = ϕ(Γ, θj) (1)
where the function ϕ(Γ, θj) is defined so that it satisfies the following conditions:
Assumption 1.1: Conditions on the function ϕ(Γ, θj)
a) The distribution function of Q(x) as defined by the expression in equation (1) is equal
to what it would have been if Q(x) had been determined on the basis of the data set x.
b) The only random variable upon which ϕ(Γ, θj) depends is the variable Γ.
4) Generate the data set x by conditioning the sampling density or mass function
g(x | θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) on the already generated value for Q(x) and the values of any an-
cillary complements of Q(x).
Observe that Assumption 1.1 differs from the corresponding assumption in Bowa-
ter (2018a) due to the absence of a condition that is similar to condition (c) of Assump-
tion 1.1 in this earlier paper.
In the context of the above algorithm, the variable Γ will be referred to as a primary
random variable (primary r.v.), which is consistent with how this term was used in
Bowater (2017b), Bowater (2018a) and Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b). To clarify, if
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this algorithm was rewritten so that the value γ of the variable Γ was generated by
setting it equal to a deterministic function of an already generated value for Q(x) and
the parameter θj, then Γ would not be a primary r.v.
3.2. Types of fiducial argument
Although the fiducial argument is usually considered to be a single argument, in this
section we will clarify and develop the argument by breaking it down into three separate
but related sub-arguments.
Definition 2(a): Strong or standard fiducial argument
This is the argument that the density function of the primary r.v. Γ after the data have
been observed, i.e. the post-data density function of Γ, should be equal to the pre-data
density function of Γ, i.e. the density function pi0(γ) as defined in step 2 of the algorithm
in Assumption 1. In the case where nothing or very little was known about the parameter
θj before the data were observed, justifications for this argument, without using Bayesian
reasoning, were outlined in Section 3.1 of Bowater (2017b), Section 6 of Bowater (2018a)
and Section 3.6 of Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b), and therefore will not be repeated here.
Definition 2(b): Moderate fiducial argument
This type of fiducial argument will be assumed to be only applicable to cases where values
of the primary r.v. Γ that were possible before the data were observed, i.e. values in the
set {γ : pi0(γ) > 0}, are made impossible by the act of observing the data. Under this
condition, it is the argument that, over the set of values of Γ that are still possible given
the data, the relative height of the post-data density function of Γ should be equal to
the relative height of the pre-data density function of Γ.
It is an argument that can be certainly viewed as being less attractive than the strong
fiducial argument as its use implies that our beliefs about Γ will be modified by the data.
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Nevertheless, it will be made clear in Section 7.1 how this argument can be adequately
justified without using Bayesian reasoning in an important class of cases.
Definition 2(c): Weak fiducial argument
This argument will be assumed to be only applicable to cases where the use of neither
the strong nor the moderate fiducial argument is considered to be appropriate. It is the
argument that, over the set of values of the primary r.v. Γ that are possible given the
data, the relative height of the post-data density function of Γ should be equal to the
relative height of the pre-data density function of Γ multiplied by weights on the values
of Γ that are determined from a function over the parameter θj that was specified before
the data were observed. The precise way in which these weights over the values of Γ are
formed will be defined in Section 3.4.
Similar to the strong and moderate fiducial arguments, this type of fiducial argument
can be adequately justified without using Bayesian reasoning in many important cases.
Such a justification and examples of the cases in question will be presented in Section 8.
3.3. Expressing pre-data knowledge about θj
In the theory of organical fiducial inference, it will be assumed that pre-data knowledge
about the parameter θj is expressed through what will be called a global pre-data function
and a local pre-data function for θj, which have the following definitions.
Definition 3: Global pre-data (GPD) function
The global pre-data (GPD) function ωG(θj) is any given non-negative and locally in-
tegrable function over the space of the parameter θj. It is a function that only needs
to be specified up to a proportionality constant, in the sense that if it is multiplied by
a positive constant, then the value of the constant is redundant. If ωG(θj) = 0 for all
θj ∈ A where A is a given subset of the real line, then this implies that it was regarded
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as being impossible that θj ∈ A before the data x were observed. Unlike a Bayesian prior
density, it is not controversial to use a GPD function that is not globally integrable.
In many cases, the GPD function will have the following simple form:
ωG(θj) =
{
0 if θj ∈ A
b otherwise
(2)
where the set A may be empty and b > 0 is a constant that has, of course, a redundant
value. This GPD function will be called the neutral GPD function.
Definition 4: Local pre-data (LPD) function
The local pre-data (LPD) function ωL(θj) is a function of the parameter θj that has
the same mathematical properties as the GPD function, i.e. it is a non-negative and
locally integrable function over the space of θj that only needs to be specified up to
a proportionality constant. Its role is to complete the definition of the joint post-data
density function of the primary r.v. Γ and the parameter θj in cases where using either
the strong or moderate fiducial argument alone is not sufficient to achieve this. For
this reason, the LPD function is in fact redundant in many situations. We describe
this function as being ‘local’ because it is only used in the inferential process under the
condition that γ equals a specific value, and with this condition in place and given the
data x, the parameter θj usually must lie in a compact set that is contained in a very
small region of the real line. It will be seen that because of this, even if the LPD function
is not redundant, its influence on the inferential process will usually be relatively minor.
3.4. Univariate fiducial density functions
Given the data x, the fiducial density function of the parameter θj conditional on the
parameters in the set θ−j being known, i.e. the density function f(θj | θ−j, x), will be
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defined according to the following two compatible principles.
Principle 1 for defining the fiducial density f(θj | θ−j, x)
This principle requires that the following condition is satisfied.
Condition 1
Let Gx and Hx be the sets of all values of Γ and θj respectively that are possible given
the value of the fiducial statistic q(x) and its ancillary complement, if it exists, that are
calculated on the basis of the data x. In defining these sets, it is assumed that values of
θj that were regarded as being impossible before the data were observed can not be made
possible by observing the data. Given this notation, the present condition is satisfied if,
on substituting the variable Q(x) in equation (1) by the value q(x), this equation would
define a bijective mapping between the set Gx and the set Hx.
Under Condition 1, the fiducial density function f(θj | θ−j, x) is defined by setting Q(x)
equal to q(x) in equation (1), and then treating the value θj as being a realisation of the
random variable Θj, to give the expression:
q(x) = ϕ(Γ,Θj)
except that, instead of Γ necessarily having the density function pi0(γ) as defined in
step 2 of the algorithm in Assumption 1, it will be assumed to have the following density
function:
pi1(γ) =
{
c1ωG(θj(γ))pi0(γ) if γ ∈ Gx
0 otherwise
(3)
where θj(γ) is the value of θj that maps on to the value γ, the function ωG(θj(γ)) is the
GPD function as introduced by Definition 3, and c1 is a normalising constant.
The function pi1(γ) will be regarded as being the post-data density function of Γ. Also,
in the definition of the weak fiducial argument, i.e. Definition 2(c), the function over θj
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that is used to determine the weights on γ values in the construction of this density
function for Γ will now be identified as being the GPD function.
Observe that if the GPD function is neutral, i.e. it has the form given in equation (2),
then over the set Gx, the density pi1(γ) will be equal to the pre-data density pi0(γ)
conditioned to lie in this set. For this type of GPD function, if
Gx = {γ : pi0(γ) > 0} (4)
then clearly the procedure for making inferences about θj will depend on the strong fidu-
cial argument, otherwise it will depend on the moderate fiducial argument. Alternatively,
if the GPD function is not equal to a positive constant over the set Hx, then we can see
that inferences about θj will be made by using the weak fiducial argument.
Furthermore notice that if, on substituting the variable Q(x) by the value q(x), equa-
tion (1) defines an injective mapping from the set {γ : pi0(γ) > 0} to the space of the
parameter θj, then the GPD function ωG(θj) expresses in effect our pre-data beliefs about
θj relative to what is implied by the strong fiducial argument. By doing so, it determines
whether the strong, moderate or weak fiducial argument is used to make inferences about
θj, and also the way in which the latter two arguments influence the inferential process.
In this respect, under the same assumption concerning equation (1), it can be seen
that if the pre-data density pi0(γ) is a uniform density for Γ over (0, 1), which in theory
can be always arranged to be the case by appropriate choice of the variable Γ, and we
define
d =
∫
γ∈D
ωG(θj(γ))dγ and e =
∫
γ∈E
ωG(θj(γ))dγ
where D and E are non-empty subsets of the interval (0, 1) such that the events {Γ ∈ D}
and {Γ ∈ E} are assigned the same probability by the density pi0(γ), then assuming that
e is not zero, the probability of the event {Γ ∈ D} will be d/e times the probability of
the event {Γ ∈ E} after the data have been observed.
Finally, it should be noted that in the theory of subjective fiducial inference as outlined
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in Bowater (2018a), the density pi1(γ) is effectively always defined to be equal to the
density pi0(γ), i.e. the only type of fiducial argument that this earlier theory relies on is
the strong fiducial argument.
Principle 2 for defining the fiducial density f(θj | θ−j, x)
This principle requires that the following two conditions are satisfied.
Condition 2(a)
Given the value q(x) for the variable Q(x), it is required that,
Hx = {θj : (∃γ ∈ Gx)[θj ∈ θj(γ)]}
where Gx and Hx are as defined in Condition 1, and θj(γ) is the set of values of θj that
map on to the value γ according to equation (1).
Condition 2(b)
The GPD function ωG(θj) must be equal to a positive constant over the set Hx.
Under Conditions 2(a) and 2(b), the fiducial density function f(θj | θ−j, x) is defined
by
f(θj | θ−j, x) =
∫
γ∈Gx
ω∗(θj | γ)pi1(γ)dγ (5)
where pi1(γ) is as defined in equation (3), although ωG(θj(γ)) will always be equal to
a positive constant in this equation, and the conditional density function ω∗(θj | γ) is
defined by
ω∗(θj | γ) =
{
c2(γ)ωL(θj) if θj ∈ θj(γ)
0 otherwise
(6)
where ωL(θj) is the LPD function as introduced by Definition 4, and c2(γ) is a normalising
constant, which clearly must depend on the value of γ.
It can be seen that the density function f(θj | θ−j, x) as defined by equation (5) is
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formed by marginalising, with respect to γ, a joint density of Γ and θj that is based on
ω∗(θj | γ) being the conditional density of θj given γ, and on pi1(γ) being the marginal
density of Γ. Similar to what was the case under Principle 1, if the condition in equa-
tion (4) is satisfied, then the density pi1(γ) will be equal to the density pi0(γ), i.e. the
density function f(θj | θ−j, x) is determined on the basis of the strong fiducial argument,
otherwise it is determined on the basis of the moderate argument. However, in contrast
to what was the case under Principle 1, the weak fiducial argument is never used to make
inferences about θj.
Also, we can observe that the density function ω∗(θj | γ) defined in equation (6) is
formed by normalising the LPD function after θj has been restricted to lie in the subset
θj(γ). The role of the density ω∗(θj | γ) is therefore to make use of the nature of the LPD
function to distribute θj over those values of θj that are consistent with any given value
of γ. For this reason, it is assumed that the LPD function ωL(θj) is chosen to reflect what
we believe about θj. In particular, these beliefs are assumed to be our pre-data rather
than post-data beliefs about θj, as otherwise it is evident that, in general, we would be
guilty of making inferences about θj by using the data twice. As eluded to in Definition 4,
the sets θj(γ) will in general be compact sets that are usually wholly contained within
very small regions of the real line.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that if Condition 2(b) is satisfied, then Principle 1 is
essentially a special case of Principle 2. This is because to apply Principle 1 it is required
that Condition 1 holds, and if it does then, first, Condition 2(a) must hold, second, the
density ω∗(θj | γ) could be regarded as converting itself into a point mass function at
the value θj(γ), and third, as a result of this, the joint density function of Γ and θj in
equation (5) effectively becomes a univariate density function. Therefore, the integration
of this latter function with respect to γ would be naturally regarded as being redundant.
As a final point, we need to acknowledge the fact that important cases exist in which
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neither Condition 1 is satisfied nor Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) are both satisfied. If Condi-
tion 2(a) does not hold, then we have a problem that could be described as ‘spillage’ due
to the fact that the set Hx will be a proper subset of {θj : (∃γ ∈ Gx)[θj ∈ θj(γ)]}, and
therefore this latter set ‘spills out’ of the set Hx. How to deal with this problem of spillage
will be returned to in Section 7.2, and how to deal with cases where Condition 2(b) does
not hold will be discussed in Section 8.
4. Multivariate organic fiducial inference
We will now consider the case where all the parameters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk in the sampling
model are unknown.
Definition 5: Joint fiducial density functions
Under the assumption that Principles 1 or 2, or any natural variations on these principles,
can be used to define the full conditional fiducial densities
f(θj |θ−j, x) for j = 1, 2, . . . , k (7)
and that this set of conditional densities determine a joint density function for the param-
eters θ1, θ2, . . . , θk, this latter density function will be defined as being the joint fiducial
density function of these parameters, and will be denoted as f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x). It can
be easily shown that this density function will always be unique.
To corroborate that the set of full conditional densities in equation (7) actually de-
termine a joint density function for the parameters concerned, the analytical or the
computational method that were proposed for this purpose in Bowater (2018a) could be
applied. These methods will now be briefly described.
An analytical method
Under the assumption that the set of full conditional densities in equation (7) can be ex-
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pressed analytically, a way of establishing whether they determine a joint density function
for θ1, θ2, . . . , θk is simply to propose an analytic expression for such a density function,
derive the full conditional densities of the proposed density function, and see if they
match the full conditionals in equation (7).
Statement about incompatible full conditional densities
It is not acknowledged in the following subsection or in Section 6.3 that the stationary
density of an ergodic Gibbs sampler is affected by the scanning order of the variables
on which the sampler is based when the full conditional densities concerned are incom-
patible. These sections will be rewritten in due course to take this important issue
into account. Nevertheless, doing so will not affect the relevance of the results that are
currently presented in the example in the latter section.
A computational method
A more general method for establishing whether the full conditional densities in equa-
tion (7) determine a joint density function for the parameters concerned is based on
attempting to generate random samples from this joint density by applying the Gibbs
sampler (Geman and Geman 1984 and Gelfand and Smith 1990) to the full conditionals
in question. Of course, the Gibbs sampler, assuming that it is irreducible and aperiodic,
will only converge to a unique stationary density if the joint density f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x)
actually exists (and the reverse is also true). For this reason, we now choose to redefine
the problem as being one of trying to establish whether the Gibbs sampler converges to
a unique stationary density on the basis of the observed behaviour of this sampler.
This may also seem to be a difficult problem to resolve. However, in a more conven-
tional application of the Gibbs sampler, we are faced with the similar problem of whether
the sampler converges to its unique stationary density in a reasonable amount of time,
i.e. before a large pre-specified number of cycles of the sampler have been completed.
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This is the reason why a substantial number of techniques have been developed to assess
whether Monte Carlo Markov chains, such as the Gibbs sampler, converge to their unique
stationary densities within a given finite number of cycles, see for example Gelman and
Rubin (1992) and Brooks and Roberts (1998).
Obviously, if there is the added complication that we are not completely sure that the
Gibbs sampler has a unique stationary density, then it would seem appropriate that we
use these convergence diagnostics more intensively. On the whole though, if in the context
of having already taken into account how the full conditional densities in equation (7)
were formed, the use of such diagnostics can give us a high degree of confidence that the
Gibbs sampler has converged to a unique stationary density, then of course we should
have a high degree of confidence that the joint fiducial density f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x) does
indeed exist.
An important benefit of using the Gibbs sampling method that has just been described
is that to calculate expectations of interest with respect to this joint fiducial density, we
will often need to rely on simulation methods such as the Gibbs sampler. Therefore by
using this Gibbs sampling method, two goals can be achieved simultaneously.
5. An example with continuous data and little pre-data knowledge
We will now apply the methodology put forward in the previous sections to some exam-
ples. To begin with, let us consider the standard problem of making inferences about the
mean µ of a normal density function, when its variance σ2 is unknown, on the basis of a
sample x of size n, i.e. x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), drawn from the density function concerned.
Although the way in which the theory of subjective fiducial inference can be used to
solve this problem was detailed in Bowater (2018a), let us quickly place this problem in
the context of the type of inference that is the subject of the present paper, i.e. organic
fiducial inference.
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If σ2 is known, a sufficient statistic for µ is the sample mean x¯, which therefore can
be assumed to be the fiducial statistic Q(x). Based on this assumption, equation (1) can
be expressed as
x¯ = ϕ(Γ, µ) = µ+ (σ/
√
n)Γ (8)
where Γ ∼ N(0, 1). Under the assumption that nothing or very little was known about
µ before the data x were observed, it is quite natural to specify the GPD function for
µ as follows: ωG(µ) = a, µ ∈ (−∞,∞), where a > 0. Furthermore, since equation (8)
will always satisfy Condition 1, the fiducial density f(µ |σ2, x) can be always determined
by Principle 1. In particular, as the GPD function is neutral, and the condition in
equation (4) will be satisfied, the fiducial density in question is derived under this principle
by applying the strong fiducial argument. As a result, it can be easily shown that this
fiducial density is defined by
µ |σ2, x ∼ N(x¯, σ2/n)
On the other hand, if µ is known, a sufficient statistic for σ2 is σˆ2 = (1/n)
∑n
i=1(xi−µ)2
which will be assumed to be Q(x). Based on this assumption, equation (1) can be
expressed as
σˆ2 = ϕ(Γ, σ2) = (σ2/n)Γ
where Γ ∼ χ2n. Under the assumption of no or very little pre-data knowledge about σ2,
it is quite natural to specify the GPD function for σ2 as follows: ωG(σ
2) = b if σ2 ≥ 0
and 0 otherwise, where b > 0. Furthermore, we can see that Principle 1 will be again
always applicable, and as the GPD function is neutral and the condition in equation (4)
will be satisfied, the fiducial density f(σ2 |µ, x) is derived under this principle by again
calling on the strong fiducial argument. As a result, it can be easily shown that this
fiducial density is a scaled inverse χ2 density function with n degrees of freedom and
scaling parameter equal to σˆ2.
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Finally, by using the analytical method outlined in Section 4, it can be easily estab-
lished that the conditional density functions f(µ |σ2, x) and f(σ2 |µ, x) that have just
been defined determine a joint fiducial density for µ and σ2, and by integrating over
this joint density function, it can be deduced that the marginal fiducial density for µ is
defined by
µ |x ∼ tn−1(x¯, s/
√
n) (9)
where s is the sample standard deviation, i.e. it is the well-used non-standardised Student
t density function with n−1 degrees of freedom, location parameter equal to x¯ and scaling
parameter equal to s/
√
n.
The full conditional fiducial densities for many other problems of inference are natu-
rally obtained in a similar way, i.e. under Principle 1, with a neutral GPD function and
applying the strong fiducial argument. For example, the full conditional fiducial densities
that were put forward in all the applications of subjective fiducial inference that were
discussed in Bowater (2018a) can be derived either exactly or approximately under the
same assumptions.
Let us now turn to the issue of how to interpret the joint fiducial density functions
f(θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x) that can be derived under these assumptions in terms of the framework
of generalised subjective probability, i.e. the definition of probability outlined in Bowater
and Guzma´n (2018b). In accordance with what was explained back in Section 2, to
complete the definition of any fiducial or posterior distribution, within this framework,
we require both the distribution function of the variables concerned, and an assessment of
the external strength of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest.
With regard to the main example of the present section, a detailed evaluation of the
external strength of the fiducial distribution function of µ given σ2, i.e. F (µ |σ2, x), was
provided in Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b). In particular, it was shown how it can be
argued that if the compound events R(λ) in the reference set R (using the notation of this
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earlier paper) are made up of the outcomes of a well-understood physical experiment, e.g.
the positions of a wheel after it has been spun, then, for any resolution λ ∈ [0.05, 0.95],
the relative external strength of the distribution function F (µ |σ2, x) should be judged as
being at a level that is close to the highest attainable level. On the basis of the arguments
presented in Bowater (2018a) and Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b), the same conclusion
can be reached about the relative external strength of the fiducial distribution function
of σ2 given µ, i.e. F (σ2 |µ, x).
Since the joint fiducial distribution function of µ and σ2 is fully defined by two distri-
bution functions, namely F (µ |σ2, x) and F (σ2 |µ, x), that, under the assumptions that
have been made about the reference set R and the resolution λ, can both be argued as
being externally very strong, then under the same assumptions, it can be argued that
this joint distribution function should also be regarded as being externally very strong.
In loose terms, this means that the joint distribution of µ and σ2 in question should
be regarded as being close in nature to the kind of probability distribution that would
be placed over the outcomes of the physical experiment on which the reference set R is
based. By generalising the same line of reasoning (see Bowater 2018a for clarification),
similar conclusions can be reached about the relative external strengths of the joint fidu-
cial distribution functions F (θ1, θ2, . . . , θk |x) that can be derived for other problems that
satisfy the criteria of the cases that have been considered in the present section, e.g. the
problems discussed in Bowater (2018a).
6. Examples with discrete data and little pre-data knowledge
In this section, organic fiducial inference will be applied to examples in which the data
x are discrete, and where nothing or very little was known about the model parameters
before the data were observed.
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6.1. Inference about a binomial proportion
First, let us consider the problem of making inferences about the population proportion
of successes p on the basis of observing x successes in n trials, where the probability of
observing any given number of successes y follows the usual definition of the binomial
mass function as specified by:
g0(y | p) =
(
n
y
)
py(1− p)n−y for y = 0, 1, . . . , n
As clearly the value x is a sufficient statistic for p, it will therefore be assumed to be
the fiducial statistic Q(x). Based on this assumption, equation (1) can be expressed as
x = ϕ(Γ, p) = min{z : Γ <
z∑
y=0
g0(y | p)} (10)
where Γ ∼ U(0, 1). Under the assumption of no or very little pre-data knowledge about
p, it is again quite natural that the GPD function has the following form: ωG(p) = a
if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise, where a > 0. This time, though, since equation (10)
will never satisfy Condition 1 for any choice of the GPD function and for any value of
x, we can never apply Principle 1. On the other hand, this equation together with the
specified GPD function will satisfy Condition 2(a) for all possible values of x, and since
Condition 2(b) will also hold for all x, Principle 2 can always be applied. Furthermore,
as the condition in equation (4) will also be satisfied, inferences will be made about p
under this principle by using the strong fiducial argument.
As a result, by placing the present case in the context of the general definition of
the fiducial density f(θj | θ−j, x) given in equations (5) and (6), we obtain the following
expression for the fiducial density f(p |x):
f(p |x) =
∫ 1
0
ω∗(p | γ)dγ (11)
where
ω∗(p | γ) =
{
c2(γ)ωL(p) if p ∈ p(γ)
0 otherwise
(12)
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Of course, to be able to complete this definition, a LPD function ωL(p) needs to be spec-
ified. Observe that any choice for this function that satisfies the very loose requirements
of Definition 4 will lead to a fiducial density f(p |x) that is valid for any n ≥ 1 and
any x = 0, 1, . . . , n. Nevertheless, to provide two practical examples, we will choose to
highlight the two LPD functions that are defined by
ωL(p) = b if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise, where b > 0 (13)
and by
ωL(p) = 1/
√
p(1− p) if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise (14)
For both these LPD functions and in general, it will not be possible to obtain a closed-
form expression for the fiducial density f(p |x) for any given value of x. However, drawing
random values from this density function will be generally fairly straightforward.
In this respect, the histograms in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) were each formed on the basis
of one million independent random values drawn from the density function f(p |x), with
n being equal to 10 and the observed x being equal to 1. The results in Figure 1(a) depend
on choosing the LPD function to be the one given in equation (13), while the results in
Figure 1(b) depend on this function being as defined in equation (14). The dashed-line
curves in these figures represent the posterior density for p that corresponds to the prior
density for p being uniform on (0, 1), while the solid-line curves in these figures represent
the posterior density for p that corresponds to the prior density for p being the Jeffreys
prior for the case in question, i.e. the density function that is proportional to the function
for p in equation (14).
It can be seen from these figures that, although the posterior density for p is highly
sensitive to which of the two prior densities is used, the fiducial density for p barely moves
depending on whether the LPD function is proportional to the uniform prior, or whether
it is proportional to the Jeffreys prior for this case. Moreover, we can observe that the
two fiducial densities for p in question both closely approximate the posterior density for
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Figure 1: Samples from the organic fiducial density of a binomial proportion
p that is based on this Jeffreys prior.
Similar to the previous section, let us now turn to the issue of how to interpret the
fiducial density f(p |x) in terms of the framework of generalised subjective probability. It
will be assumed that the reference set R and the range of the resolution λ are as defined
in this earlier section.
To begin with, on the basis of the lines of reasoning presented in Bowater (2018a) and
Bowater and Guzma´n (2018b), it can be argued that the relative external strength of the
distribution function that corresponds to the post-data density of the primary r.v. Γ, i.e.
the uniform density function pi1(γ), should be judged as being at a level that is close to
the highest attainable level, which loosely means that arguably this density should be
an extremely good representation of our post-data beliefs about Γ. On the other hand,
given that it is being assumed that we have no or very little pre-data knowledge about p,
it will not be easy to find an LPD function ωL(p) that adequately represents our pre-data
beliefs about p. Therefore, it would be expected that similar to any prior distribution
function that could be chosen for p in this type of situation, the distribution functions
that correspond to the conditional densities ω∗(p | γ) defined in equation (12) would be
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judged as being externally quite weak.
Nevertheless, since these latter distribution functions are defined over intervals for p
that will be generally much shorter than the interval for p over which the prior distribution
function for p must be defined, i.e. the interval (0, 1), it would be expected that, on the
whole, they would be regarded as being externally much stronger than any given prior
distribution function for p. Moreover, since in cases where n is not very small and x is not
equal to 0 or n, the role of the LPD function ωL(p) could be described as being heavily
subordinate to the role of the density pi1(γ) in the construction of the joint density of p
and γ in equation (11), it can be argued that, in these cases, the distribution function
that corresponds to the fiducial density f(p |x) should be regarded as being externally
very strong. In loose terms, this means that the fiducial probability of p lying in any
given interval of moderate width should be regarded as being close in nature to the
probabilities of the events contained in the reference set R.
By contrast, since the posterior density for p is effectively obtained through Bayes’
theorem by simply reweighting the prior density for p, that is, by normalising the den-
sity function that results from multiplying this prior density function by the likelihood
function, it would seem difficult to use a form of a reasoning that is compatible with the
Bayesian paradigm, to argue that the relative external strength of the posterior distri-
bution function for p should not be heavily dependent on the relative external strength
of the prior distribution function for p, which as already mentioned would be expected
to be externally quite weak.
6.2. Inference about a Poisson rate parameter
We will now consider the problem of making inferences about an unknown event rate τ
on the basis of observing x events over a time period of length t, where the probability
of observing any given number of events y over a period of this length follows the usual
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definition of the Poisson mass function as specified by:
g1(y | τ) = (τ y/y!) exp(−τ) for y = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Again, since the data set to be analysed consists of a single value x, this value will be
assumed to be the fiducial statistic Q(x). Based on this assumption, equation (1) can be
expressed in a way that is similar to equation (10), i.e.
x = ϕ(Γ, τ) = min{z : Γ <
z∑
y=0
g1(y | τ)} (15)
where Γ ∼ U(0, 1).
As it will be assumed that there was no or very little pre-data knowledge about τ , the
GPD function will again be specified in the following way: ωG(τ) = a for τ > 0 and 0
otherwise, where a > 0. Similar also to the previous problem, the nature of equation (15)
means that Principle 1 can never be applied for any choice of the GPD function, but the
particular choice that has been made for this latter function means that Principle 2 can
always be applied, and in particular, inferences will be made about τ under this principle
by using the strong fiducial argument.
As a result, expressions that define the fiducial density f(τ |x) are identical to the
expressions in equations (11) and (12) except that the proportion p is replaced by the
event rate τ . Although any choice for the LPD function ωL(τ) that conforms to Defini-
tion 4 will imply that this fiducial density is valid for any x = 0, 1, 2, . . ., let us choose to
highlight the consequences of using the two LPD functions that are defined by
ωL(τ) = b if τ > 0 and 0 otherwise, where b > 0 (16)
and by
ωL(τ) = 1/
√
τ if τ > 0 and 0 otherwise (17)
In this regard, Figures 2(a) and 2(b) each show a histogram that was formed on the
basis of one million independent random values drawn from the density function f(τ |x),
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Figure 2: Samples from the organic fiducial density of a Poisson event rate
under the assumption that two events were observed over a given period of length t,
i.e. x = 2, with the LPD functions that underlie the results in these two figures being
defined by equation (13) and by equation (14) respectively. In these figures, the dashed-
line curves represent the posterior density for τ that corresponds to the prior density
for τ being the function for τ in equation (16), while the solid-line curves represent this
posterior density when the prior density for τ is the function for τ in equation (17),
i.e. the Jeffreys prior for the case in question. Observe that the use of these two prior
densities for τ is controversial as they are both improper.
It is evident that there is almost no difference between the two histograms in Fig-
ures 2(a) and 2(b), and as was the case for the histograms in Figures 1(a) and 1(b),
they are both closely approximated by the posterior density that is based on the Jeffreys
prior for the problem of interest. Furthermore, using a very similar line of reasoning
to the one that in Section 6.1 was used to argue that, under certain assumptions, the
distribution function that corresponds to the fiducial density f(p |x) should be regarded
as being externally very strong, it can also be argued, under the same assumptions about
the set R and the resolution λ, that if x > 0, the distribution function that corresponds
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to the fiducial density of current interest, i.e. f(τ |x), should also be regarded as being
externally very strong.
6.3. Inference about multinomial proportions
To conclude this section, let us consider the problem of making inferences about the
population proportions p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk+1)
′ of all the k+ 1 outcomes of an experiment,
where pi is the proportion of times outcome i is generated by the experiment, based on
observing any given sample of counts x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1)
′ of these outcomes, where
xi is the number of times outcome i is observed, and the probability of observing this
sample followed the usual definition of the multinomial mass function as specified by:
g(x | p) = n!
x1!x2! · · ·xk+1!
k+1∏
i=1
pxii for x1, x2, . . . , xk+1 ∈ Z≥0, where n =
∑k+1
i=1 xi
Given that pk+1 = 1 −
∑k
i=1 pi, let us define the complete set of model parameters
as being the set {p1, p2, . . . , pk}. Now, if it is assumed that all the proportions in this
set are known except pj, a set of sufficient statistics for pj would be {xj, xj + xk+1}.
However, xj + xk+1 is an ancillary statistic, and therefore according to Definition 1, it
can be assumed that xj is the fiducial statistic Q(x). Under this assumption, and taking
into account that the quantity pj+pk+1 is known, it is convenient to express the definition
of the conditional fiducial density f(pj | p−j, x), where p−j = {p1, . . . , pj−1, pj+1, . . . , pk},
in terms of the fiducial density f(rj | p−j, x), where rj = pj/((pj + pk+1). This is because
the definition of this latter fiducial density is equivalent to the definition of the fiducial
density f(p |x) in equations (11) and (12) except that p, x and n in this earlier definition
are substituted by rj, xj and xj + xk+1 respectively.
In this way, the set of full conditional fiducial densities for this problem can be deter-
mined, i.e. the set
f(pj | p−j, x) for j = 1, 2, . . . , k (18)
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On the basis of having done this, the histograms in Figures 3(a)-(d) summarise a
sample of three million realisations of all the parameters of a multinomial distribution
function with k = 4 that was obtained by excluding an initial burn-in sample of 500 of
such random vectors from one run of a Gibbs sampler applied to this set of full conditional
densities. The sample of counts x was (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)′, and to complete the definition of these
conditional fiducial densities, the LPD functions concerned, i.e. {ωL(pj) : j = 1, 2, 3, 4}
were all chosen to have the form of the LPD function given in equation (13). The Gibbs
sampler in question was also run various times more from different starting points, and
the results provided no evidence to suggest that the sampler was failing to converge to a
unique stationary density function. Therefore, it would seem reasonably safe to assume
that the full conditional densities in equation (18) determine a joint fiducial density for
the parameters concerned, and we have succeeded in generating a series of random vectors
from this density function.
The solid-line curves in Figures 3(a)-(d) represent the marginal posterior densities for
each of the parameters p1, p2, p3 and p4 respectively when the joint prior density for these
parameters is the Jeffreys prior for the case in question, i.e. a symmetric Dirichlet density
with concentration parameter α equal to 0.5. On the other hand, the long-dashed and
short-dashed curves in these figures represent these marginal posterior densities when
the joint prior density concerned is, respectively, a uniform density and the Perks prior
density, i.e. a symmetric Dirichlet density with α equal to 1/(k+ 1). For any given value
of k, the use of the uniform prior density was advocated for example by Tuyl (2017), while
the use of the Perks prior density was advocated for example by Berger et al. (2015).
It can be seen that the histograms for the proportions p2, p3 and p4 in Figures 3(b)-
(d) are closely approximated by the marginal posterior densities corresponding to each of
these parameters when the joint prior density is the Jeffreys prior for this case, whereas
the histogram for the proportion p1 in Figure 1(a) is only loosely approximated by the
27
(a)
D
en
si
ty
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0
10
20
30
40
p1
(b)
D
en
si
ty
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
p2
(c)
D
en
si
ty
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0
1
2
3
4
p3
(d)
D
en
si
ty
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
p4
Figure 3: A sample from a joint organic fiducial density of multinomial proportions
obtained using the Gibbs sampler
marginal posterior density for p1 derived on the basis of this prior density. Also, the
covariances between all the proportions p = (p1, . . . , p5)
′, except those involving the
parameter p1, were found to be very similar between the joint fiducial density and the
joint posterior density in question. Furthermore, additional simulations showed that the
joint fiducial density in this example was not very sensitive to the choice of the LPD
functions concerned, i.e. {ωL(pj) : j = 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Before proceeding let us assume that the reference set R and the resolution λ are
defined as in previous sections. Now, given the natural relationship that exists between
any of the full conditional densities in equation (18) and the fiducial density for a binomial
proportion defined in equations (11) and (12), a similar line of reasoning to one outlined
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in Section 6.1 can be used to argue that the distribution functions that correspond to the
densities in equation (18) should all be regarded as being externally very strong provided
that xj > 0, xk+1 > 0 and xj + xk+1 is not very small for all values of j. The first of
these conditions of course does not apply in the case where x = 1 in the example that has
been highlighted, but this example was not chosen to represent the most ideal scenario.
Furthermore, since the joint fiducial distribution function of all the proportions p is fully
defined by the full conditional densities in equation (18), a similar line of reasoning
to one mentioned in Section 5 can be used to argue that this joint distribution function
should also be regarded as being externally very strong provided that the aforementioned
conditions on the counts x hold, and the total count n is not very small relative to the
number of proportions k + 1.
Finally, it needs to be taken into account that the joint fiducial distribution function
in question is potentially sensitive to which of the population proportions is defined to
be the proportion pk+1. However, extensive simulations that were conducted showed
that the effect of this choice of parameterisation was generally negligible, and was only
found to be slightly more than negligible in certain cases where the total count n was
less than the number of proportions k+ 1. Moreover, this issue can be easily resolved by
always applying the criterion of designating the proportion pk+1 so that its corresponding
count xk+1 is the highest or equal highest out of all the counts x. As the count xk+1 is
always one of the two counts that are used to form each of the full conditional fiducial
densities in equation (18), this criterion is justifiable from a statistical viewpoint, and it
also guarantees that the case is avoided where the count xk+1 = 0, and at least one of the
remaining counts equals zero, which would imply that at least one of these conditional
fiducial densities is undefined.
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7. Examples with restricted parameter spaces
Let us now turn our attention to examples of the application of organic fiducial inference
in which it was known, before the data were observed, that values in a given subset of the
natural space of the model parameters were impossible, but apart from this, nothing or
very little was known about these parameters. In relation to this issue, the importance
of the need to make inferences about a normal mean µ when there is a lower bound on µ,
and about a Poisson rate parameter τ when there is a positive lower bound on τ has been
underlined by practical examples from the field of quantum physics that are described,
for example, in Mandelkern (2002). These examples motivate what will be examined in
the present section.
7.1. Inference about a bounded normal mean with unknown variance
With regard to the example considered in Section 5, let us change what is assumed to
have been known about the mean µ before the data were observed to the assumption
that, for any given value of the variance σ2, it was known that µ > µ0, where µ0 is a
given finite constant, but apart from this, nothing or very little was known about µ. In
this situation, it is quite natural to specify the GPD function for µ as follows:
ωG(µ) =
{
a if µ > µ0
0 if µ ≤ µ0
where a > 0. Although, as was the case in Section 5, this GPD function is neutral,
this time the condition in equation (4) will never hold, and therefore the fiducial density
f(µ |σ2, x) is derived under Principle 1 by using the moderate rather than the strong
fiducial argument. The consequence of this in terms of the definition of the marginal
fiducial density for µ is that this density function becomes simply the marginal density
function for µ defined in equation (9) conditioned to lie in the interval (µ0,∞). However,
it is of interest to examine the potential effect on the relative external strength of this
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marginal density function due to the use of the moderate rather than the strong fiducial
argument in constructing the conditional density f(µ |σ2, x).
In this regard, let us remember that in the definition of the function ϕ(Γ, µ) in equa-
tion (8) it was assumed that the pre-data density function of the primary r.v. Γ, i.e. the
function pi0(γ), is a standard normal density function. Now, on observing the sample
mean x¯, we immediately know that the value γ generated in step 2 of the algorithm in
Assumption 1 must be less than the value γ0 = (
√
n/σ)(x¯− µ0).
The moderate fiducial argument in this situation, i.e. the argument that the relative
height of the post-data density function of Γ, i.e. the function pi1(γ), in the interval
(−∞, γ0) should be equal to the relative height of pi0(γ) over this interval, is similar (but
not identical) to the Bayesian argument that the relative height of a density function for
a fixed parameter θ should not be affected by learning that a given subset of values for θ
are impossible, apart from it of course becoming equal to zero over this subset. Although
this type of Bayesian argument has been criticised as being overly simplified due to the
fact that it does not take into account the manner in which we learn that values in the
particular subset are impossible, see for example Shafer (1985), it is an argument that
is considered as being almost universally acceptable. For this reason, under the same
assumptions about the reference set R and the resolution λ as made in previous sections,
it can be argued that the density function pi1(γ), i.e. a standard normal density for γ
truncated to the interval (−∞, γ0), in the context of being a representation of what is
believed about γ after the data are observed, should be regarded as being externally very
strong. As a result, under the same assumptions, the case can be made that the joint
fiducial density of µ and σ2 in the present example, and the marginal densities that can
be derived from this joint density should also be regarded as being externally very strong.
Clearly the same type of reasoning can be applied to many other problems of inference
over restricted parameter spaces that are similar to the problem that has just been
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discussed.
7.2. Inference about a bounded Poisson rate parameter
Returning to the problem of making inferences about a Poisson rate parameter τ that
was discussed in Section 6.2, let us now assume that before the data were observed, it was
known that τ > τ0, where τ0 is a given positive constant, but apart from this, nothing
or very little was known about τ . Again, as was the case in Section 6.2, it is clear that
Principle 1 can not be applied to determine the fiducial density of τ .
Observe that, in this new situation, the set Hx as defined in Condition 1, where the
parameter θj in this definition is τ , is the set {τ : τ > τ0}, and that it is natural
to specify the GPD function ωG(τ) so that Condition 2(b) is satisfied. However, in
contrast to the example outlined in Section 6.2, the definition of the function ϕ(Γ, τ)
given in equation (15) implies that the set Gx as defined in Condition 1 does not satisfy
Condition 2(a), and therefore we have the problem of ‘spillage’ that was referred to at
the end of Section 3.4.
The first step of a very straightforward way of trying to circumvent this difficulty is
to make inferences about τ in an artificial scenario, namely the scenario considered in
Section 6.2. In doing this, it will be assumed that the LPD function is chosen to represent
as best as possible a general situation where nothing or very little was known about the
parameter τ over the interval (0,∞) before the data were observed, e.g. the LPD function
given in equation (16) or equation (17). Having determined a fiducial density for τ over
the interval (0,∞) by using this method, we then simply condition this density to lie
in the interval (τ0,∞) to thereby obtain a fiducial density for τ that corresponds to the
problem at hand.
Although in applying this strategy we do not directly use any of the three types of
fiducial argument outlined in Section 3.2, if the same strategy was applied to the example
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discussed in Section 7.1, which of course would not require the use of a LPD function,
then the fiducial density of µ conditional on σ2 being known, i.e. the density f(µ |σ2, x),
would be the same as is obtained by using the approach put forward in this previous
section, i.e. an approach that is based on the moderate fiducial argument. On the other
hand, the strategy has the clear disadvantage that it depends on expressing pre-data
knowledge about a parameter of interest via the GPD function, and possibly also via
the LPD function, with regard to an artificial scenario rather than the scenario that
is actually under consideration. Nevertheless, under the same assumptions about the
reference set R and the resolution λ as made in previous sections, it still can be argued
that, if in the present example, the observed count x is greater than zero and is not very
small relative to the threshold τ0, then the fiducial density for τ that results from using
this strategy should be regarded as being externally quite strong.
To give a good practical example of the application of the strategy that has just been
discussed, let us suppose that the threshold τ0, which will be regarded as the event rate
for the background noise over a time length t, needs to be estimated on the basis of a
Poisson count x0 collected over a period of length α times t when only background noise
could be present, where α is a given value. Since it will be assumed that τ0 can take
any positive value, the fiducial density of τ0 formed on the basis of the data x0, i.e. the
density f(τ0 |x0), is defined in the same way as the fiducial density f(τ |x) was defined
in Section 6.2. Taking into account also a Poisson count x collected over a period of
length t when a signal should be present, we will then be interested in making inferences
about the event rate τ = τ0 + τ1 over this time period, which will be regarded as the
event rate for background noise plus the signal. Due to the fact that τ1 will be assumed
to be a positive event rate, namely the event rate for the signal only, the parameter τ
must be greater than τ0, and so it will be assumed that the fiducial density of τ formed
on the basis of the data x and conditioned on τ being greater than τ0, i.e. the density
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f(τ | τ0, x), is determined using the method described in the present section. Given these
definitions, the joint fiducial density of τ and τ0 can therefore be expressed as
f(τ, τ0 |x, x0) = f(τ | τ0, x)f(τ0 |x0)
To illustrate a specific case, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show histograms of one million inde-
pendent random values drawn from, respectively, the marginal density of τ = τ0 + τ1 and
the marginal density of τ1 over this joint fiducial density assuming that the LPD function
that was used to form both of the densities f(τ | τ0, x) and f(τ0 |x0) was the simple step
function given in equation (16) and that α = 4, x0 = 3 and x = 2. The solid-line and
dashed-line curves in Figure 4(a) represent the posterior density of τ that corresponds,
respectively, to the use of the Jeffreys prior for the case when τ is unrestricted over the
interval (0,∞) and to the use of this prior density with the condition that τ > 0.75, where
0.75 (= x0/α) is clearly the maximum likelihood estimate of τ0. These curves have been
added to this figure, only because we know that, under the conditions in question, they
closely approximate the fiducial densities for τ when the LPD function being considered
is used. In particular, comparing the lower tails of the histogram and the dashed-line
curve in Figure 4(a), highlights the extra uncertainty that is introduced by taking into
account the statistical error in the estimation of τ0.
8. An example with two different GPD functions that are non-neutral
To give a final example of the application of organic fiducial inference, let us again return
to the problem of inference considered in Section 5, and let us assume that the GPD
function ωG(µ) used to determine the fiducial density of the mean µ given the variance
σ2, i.e. the density f(µ |σ2, x), is one of the two step functions defined by
ωG(µ) =
{
a if µ > 0
1 otherwise
(19)
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Figure 4: Samples from marginal organic fiducial densities of Poisson event rates
and by
ωG(µ) =
{
a if −b < µ < b
1 otherwise
(20)
where a is any given constant greater than one, and b is any given positive constant.
As a way of interpreting either of these two GPD functions, it can be observed that if
there is an interval of values (γ0, γ1) for the primary r.v. γ such that ωG(µ) = 1 for all
µ ∈ {µ(γ) : γ ∈ (γ0, γ1)}, where in keeping with earlier notation µ(γ) is the value of µ
that maps on to the value γ given the data x, and there is another interval {γ2, γ3} for
γ such that ωG(µ) = a for all µ ∈ {µ(γ) : γ ∈ (γ2, γ3)}, then the probability of the event
{γ ∈ (γ2, γ3)} divided by the probability of the event {γ ∈ (γ0, γ1)} will be regarded as
being a times larger after the data are observed than before step 2 of the algorithm in
Assumption 1 was implemented.
Clearly the GPD function in equation (19) can be used to represent the scenario in
which nothing or very little was known about µ before the data were observed, except that
it was known that, when the data are observed, positive values of µ would be regarded
as being more likely and negative values of µ less likely than as required to be able to
accept the strong fiducial argument. On the other hand, if for example b is chosen to be
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small, the GPD function in equation (20) could be used to represent a scenario where
there was little or no pre-data knowledge about µ except that, it was known that, when
the data are observed, values of µ lying in a narrow interval centred at zero, which could
be the value of µ that corresponds to the null effect of a treatment compared to a control,
would be regarded as being more likely and values of µ lying outside of this interval less
likely than as assumed by the strong fiducial argument.
On the basis of either of the GPD functions in equations (19) and (20), the fiducial
density f(µ |σ2, x) is derived under Principle 1 by applying the weak fiducial argument.
In particular, the two forms of this fiducial density that correspond to using these two
GPD functions are the same as the two forms of the posterior density for µ given σ2
that result from treating these GPD functions as prior densities for µ under the Bayesian
paradigm. However, there are at least two good reasons why it is better to regard these
densities as being fiducial densities backed by the methodology outlined in Section 3.4,
rather than posterior densities backed up by standard Bayesian theory.
First, if the GPD functions in equations (19) and (20) are treated as being prior
densities then these density functions must be improper. This is also one of a number of
criticisms that could be applied to the interpretation of the fiducial density f(µ |σ2, x)
derived in Section 5 as being a posterior density for µ, as the required prior density for
µ in this case would be a flat improper density for µ over the interval (−∞,∞). More
specifically, though, it would seem particularly awkward to try to justify either of the
improper prior densities for µ that correspond to the GPD functions being presently
considered as being a natural approximation to a proper prior density, or some kind of
natural limit of allowing a hyperparameter of a proper prior density to tend to infinity.
This is due to the discontinuity that occurs at zero for the function in equation (19), and
the discontinuities that occur at −b and b for the function in equation (20).
The second reason why it is better to use fiducial rather than Bayesian reasoning in
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the cases under consideration is that the fiducial densities f(µ |σ2, x) that correspond
to the GPD functions in equations (19) and (20) can be regarded as being based on a
set of conditional versions of these densities derived using the moderate fiducial argu-
ment. In particular, under the GPD function in equation (19), the fiducial density for µ
when µ is conditioned to lie in one of the intervals (−∞, 0) or (0,∞) would be derived
using the moderate fiducial argument, while, under the GPD function in equation (20),
the fiducial density for µ when µ is conditioned to lie in one of the subsets (−b, b) or
(−∞,−b) ∪ (b,∞) would also be derived using this type of fiducial argument. Taking
into account the intuitive appeal of the moderate fiducial argument that was discussed
in Section 7.1, the case can be made that the partial dependence on this argument that
has been identified should mean that, under the same assumptions about the reference
set R and the resolution λ as made in previous sections, the relative external strength
of the fiducial density f(µ |σ2, x), when µ is unrestricted over the whole of the real line,
and when either of the GPD functions in question is used, should be regarded as be-
ing reasonably high in many situations where the use of the GPD function concerned is
considered to be adequate.
The same line of reasoning can also be applied in assessing the relative external
strength of the fiducial density of any given parameter θj of any given sampling model
g(x | θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) conditional on all other parameters, provided that such a density for θj
can be derived under Principle 1, and the GPD function for θj is a step function with at
least two steps that have distinct non-zero heights. Furthermore, if the GPD function for
θj is allowed to take any form that simply satisfies the loose requirements of Definition 3,
then despite this line of reasoning being in general no longer applicable, the capacity to
express pre-data knowledge about θj in a way that is distinct from placing a prior density
over θj under the Bayesian paradigm will be generally retained.
On the other hand, if Condition 1 is not satisfied then, since Conditions 2(a) and 2(b)
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can only be satisfied by special, albeit quite important, forms of the GPD function for
θj, e.g. the simple choices made for this function in the cases considered in Section 6, it is
clear that over all possible choices for this function, we will not be able in general to make
inferences about θj by directly using the methodology outlined in Section 3.4. However,
in this general case, we can use a similar strategy to the one outlined in Section 7.2 by first
using Principle 2 to construct a fiducial density f(θj |θ−j, x) that would be appropriate in
the artificial scenario in which it is assumed that there was little or no pre-data knowledge
about θj, and then normalising the density function that results from multiplying this
preliminary fiducial density for θj by the GPD function for θj that corresponds to the
actual scenario being considered. For a similar reason to that which has just been outlined
combined with reasoning given in Section 7.2, this type of strategy would appear to be
particularly attractive if this latter GDP function for θj is a step function, although it
generally offers a useful alternative way of taking into account pre-data knowledge about
θj over all choices for this function.
9. Closing comment
Since the theory of organic fiducial inference is a generalisation of the theory of subjective
fiducial inference, issues that were identified in the final section of Bowater (2018a) as
being relevant to the further development of this latter theory, i.e. the coherence of
inferences based on subsets of the data set of interest, alternative definitions of the
fiducial statistic and computational issues, also apply to the theory that has been put
forward in the present paper. To save space the reader is referred to this earlier paper
for a discussion of these issues.
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